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Abstract. Price discrimination refers to the practice of dynamically
varying the prices of goods based on a customer’s purchasing power and
willingness to pay. In this paper, motivated by several anecdotal ac-
counts, we report on a three-week experiment, conducted in search of
price discrimination in airline tickets. Despite presenting the companies
with multiple opportunities for discriminating us, and contrary to our
expectations, we do not find any evidence for systematic price discrimi-
nation. At the same time, we witness the highly volatile prices of certain
airlines which make it hard to establish cause and effect. Finally, we
provide alternative explanations for the observed price differences.
1 Introduction
In today’s web, users are accustomed to getting a variety of services without
explicitly paying for them. Thus, the average user has access to mail services,
maps, search, social networks, cloud storage, and online newspapers, without
paying a subscription fee to any of them.
These services, in turn, usually make a profit either by directly providing ads
to their users, or gathering user details that are used in house, or sold to other
companies, in order to provide better targeted ads. These two are not strictly
separated because the gathering of information about a user and the showing of
ads can (and does) happen through a single action, such as the inclusion of a
remote JavaScript library from an advertising syndicator.
An alternative monetization strategy to targeted advertising, is price discrim-
ination. Price discrimination involves varying the price of any specific product
or service, depending on the amount that a customer is willing to pay. The vast
amounts of user-data gathered on the modern web are a natural fit for such a
pricing strategy [20]. Knowing, for instance, that a user visits webpages which
sell high-end goods can be used to infer the income level of that user. This
knowledge can, in turn, be used to dynamically increase the price of a product
on a, seemingly, unrelated website, simply because that user is likely to have the
ability and willingness to pay more for that product. Prior research by Mikians
et al. [17] showed that price discrimination is used to vary the prices of digital
products (such as ebooks) based on the geographical location of the user. The
authors later showed that crowdsourcing can be used to unearth harder-to-find
cases of price discrimination, such as the ones present in regional e-shops [18].
In this paper, motivated by several anecdotal reports [7,14,23], we investigate
whether airlines practice price discrimination on the tickets sold through their
websites. Airline tickets are an attractive target for price discrimination due to
the highly volatile nature of their prices. An airline could, for instance, recognize
the same user over time, e.g., through the use of cookies, and gradually increase
the price of a specific ticket. The user is likely to attribute the price increase to
flight congestion (many people buying tickets for that specific flight) and buy
the ticket at an increased price, out of fear that the price will increase even more.
Through a three-week long experiment, involving 25 different airline compa-
nies, we find that, at this time, airlines seem not to be employing any systematic
price discrimination. While we did observe some price fluctuations that could
be interpreted as due to discrimination, in most cases, these fluctuations could
be explained through other means, e.g., increased tax on tickets of a regional
airline, when those were purchased outside of that specific region. At the same
time, we show how difficult it is to establish cause and effect for airline prices
and we make available the set of prices that we collected so that it can be used
on future research on the topic of price discrimination [24].
2 Background
2.1 User Tracking
Some of the strategies that could be of use in price discrimination require the
tracking of users between page loads of the same site, as well as across different
websites.
Browser cookies have emerged as the de facto way of tracking users in the
modern web. The cookie mechanism allows a web server to store a small amount
of data on the computers of visiting users, which is then sent back to the web
server upon subsequent requests. Cookies can be separated in first-party and
third-party depending on the way on which they are set and read.
First-party cookies are cookies set by the website that the user is consciously
visiting, e.g., a user visiting the website of Delta Airlines and receiving cookies for
the delta.com domain. First-party cookies are used to, among others, maintain
state over the stateless HTTP protocol, and recognize visitors between page
loads.
Third-party cookies are cookies given by third-party servers which provide
content to a first-party page. If, for instance, Delta airlines uses a Facebook
“Like” button, Facebook has the ability to store and read cookies when the
visitor visits the delta.com website. Third-party cookies are more intrusive than
first-party cookies, since they can be used to track users in a cross-site way [12,
22]. If for instance, the sites travel.com and football.com show ads from the
same advertising syndicator, that syndicator has the ability to correlate users
between these sites and build a browsing profile for each user that can be then
monetized in series of ways, including targeted ads and the selling of a user’s
information to larger data aggregators and brokers.
Next to cookies and other techniques involving the storing of identifiers at the
client-side [15], web-based device fingerprinting is another technology that has
recently emerged and can also be used to track users. In fingerprinting, several
attributes of a user’s browsing environment, e.g., a user’s browser, platform,
screen dimensions, and installed plugins, can be combined to form a fingerprint
that is, for all practical purposes, unique [5,9,19]. The advantage of fingerprinting
is that it is stateless and, because of that, hidden from a user, i.e., no cookies to
inspect or delete.
2.2 Anecdotal Evidence of Price Discrimination
Over the past years, many articles, blog posts and Internet fora have reported
the use of price discrimination in online travel tickets. Generally, these claims are
based on anecdotal evidence. In this section, we briefly list several noteworthy
cases and discussions.
In 2011, a massively “retweeted” tweet [23] implied that Ryanair was track-
ing users through cookies and raising their prices based on the user’s previous
visits. On a blog post that followed [7], similar claims were made by people en-
tering the discussion: TheTrainline.com, Expedia, Easyjet, Virgin, Lastminute
and Eurostar were all accused of price discrimination based on previous visits
or search queries. The Wall Street Journal reported a year later that Orbitz [3],
an online travel agency (OTA), presents Apple-branded computers with more
expensive flight and hotel search results first [14], a practice that is referred to
as search discrimination [17].
In 2013, a column published in USA Today [16] specifically discussed the
current technical possibilities and legal implications of price discrimination in
the travel sector. Furthermore, they claim to have observed a price difference
with a cookie-cleared browser in tests they conducted in 2007.
More recently, in January 2014, a blogger explained how he got a less ex-
pensive fare from Kayak [2], a travel metasearch engine, by using a Canadian
instead of an American IP address [6].
3 Large-scale analysis
As noted in the previous section, airline companies have been accused of serving
different prices according to a client’s geographical location, the device they
use, their consumer profile or their previous search queries. We evaluate this
claim by analyzing 25 airlines continuously for 3 weeks, with dozens of unique
user profiles. These profiles are constructed in light of the user-tracking methods
explained in Section 2.1, and the potential discriminating factors.
To properly assess these practices, we emulate real users performing search
queries for specific flight routes. We do this repeatedly for all the different user
profiles on all regarded airlines. For every conducted search query, we keep track
of the prices that are presented to that particular user.
In the following paragraphs, we will explain the techniques used to automate
the search queries and to construct different user profiles.
3.1 Automated search querying
During 21 days, we queried 25 airlines twice a day, with 66 user profiles, from
two different geographical locations simultaneously resulting to a total of over
130,000 queries. We automated this large-scale analysis by building a scraper
using CasperJS [1], which is a navigation scripting and testing utility for Phan-
tomJS [4], a headless browser. We ensured our scraper followed the exact same
steps a normal user would follow when manually searching for airline tickets. The
scraper ran from January 15, 2014 until February 5, 2014, querying for flights
departing on March 22, 2014 and returning on March 30, 2014. The specific flight
routes that were queried were different for every airline, but fixed throughout
the entire analysis. The order in which the scraper iterated the 66 user profiles
for every airline was randomized at each run.
3.2 Constructing user profiles
We constructed a total of 66 unique user profiles, which are the result of combin-
ing several different subprofiles, described in the following sections. The major-
ity of these leveraged the ability of PhantomJS to easily configure the browser’s
internals and cookie settings. Additionally, two geographical subprofiles were
created, which were both combined with the 66 user profiles.
Browser and OS profiles The browser and operating system (OS) profiles are
set up to observe potential discrimination based on the user’s device. From a web
server’s perspective, the User-Agent string is the most straightforward feature for
identifying the client’s Internet browser and OS. When making a web request,
the client sends this string as an HTTP header to the web server. Moreover,
the User-Agent string also resides in the browser’s navigator Javascript-object,
together with other indicative strings, such as vendor, platform, appCodeName,
appName and appVersion. A web server can use this information to determine
which browser and OS a particular client is using. For example, the User-Agent
string of Safari Mobile running on an iPad with iOS 4.3.5 is easily recognized:
Mozilla/5.0 (iPad; U; CPU OS 4_3_5 like Mac OS X; en-gb)
AppleWebKit/533.17.9 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.0.2
Mobile/8L1 Safari/6533.18.5
By spoofing the information in the User-Agent string and the navigator ob-
ject, we were able to mimic different OSs and browser profiles. Our scraper was
programmed to emulate several different profiles: Internet Explorer 9 on Win-
dows 7, Chrome 29 on Windows 7, Firefox 22 on OS X 10.7, Safari 6 on OS X
10.7 and Safari Mobile 5 on iOS (iPad).
Furthermore, we configured additional Chrome, Safari and Internet Explorer
profiles with the Do Not Track (DNT) header set to 1. The DNT header is an
HTTP header which can be utilized by users to request from a web application
to disable their tracking [25].
Consumer profiles Inspired by the study of Mikians et al. [17], we designed
3 consumer profiles: affluent, budget and flight comparer. These profiles were
composed by gathering cookies of websites that can be associated with them.
For example, the cookies for the affluent profile were gathered by visiting sites
associated with luxury goods and financial news. For the budget profile, we
collected cookies from websites offering discounts and product reviews. And for
the travel comparer profile, online travel agencies and travel metasearch engines,
such as kayak.com, were included.
For each profile, we kept a separate cookie jar : all cookies gathered by a
particular consumer profile were saved in an isolated file. When a consumer pro-
file needs to be instantiated, its cookie jar can simply be loaded in PhantomJS.
This way, potential third-party trackers, could access the consumer profile cook-
ies while our crawlers visited the website of each airline.
Cookie setting profiles As discussed in Section 2.1, websites can make use of
first-party and third-party cookies to track users between loads of the same page
and across different websites. In our experiment, we accounted for four different
cookie settings, when gathering ticket prices for each airline:
– Only consumer profile cookies (gathered in advance)
– Consumer profile cookies along with first-party cookies
– Only first-party cookies (also known as no third-party cookies)
– No cookies
In our experiments, the first-party cookies are the cookies set by the airlines
themselves which can be used to track a user’s previous visits and searches and
potentially influence the prices shown to users over time.
Geographical profile Websites often resort to the user’s IP address as an
indicator of locality [6,17]. In order to set up different geographical profiles, the
scraper ran simultaneously from two different locations, one in New York, United
States and one in Leuven, Belgium.
3.3 Hypothesis
In order to evaluate the presence of systematic price discrimination, we test
for the following hypothesis: if airlines present unequal prices to different users
according to their consumer profile, location, or browsing history, we should be
able to observe this when comparing the prices presented to a set of emulated
users that differ in those characteristics, over several points in time. For instance,
if a company is presenting higher prices to users of Apple products, a time-series
graph of ticket prices should place our emulated Apple user “above” other users.
3.4 Limitations and assumptions
The search queries were not executed in parallel, but consecutively per profile on
each location. The rational for this design choice is the following: performing a
large number of simultaneous search queries may disrupt the airline’s web server.
Furthermore, if they engage in some form of rate limiting, our requests could be
rejected, prohibiting us from reliably measuring prices. Similarly, we performed
all search queries only twice a day for each airline, rather than continuously for
our three-week measurement.
All profiles originating from a single geographical location had the same IP
address. However, because of the widespread use of NAT technology, it is com-
monly assumed inadequate for a web server to distinguish between users based
on their IP address. Since covering every possible geographical variance is virtu-
ally impossible, we only used two geographical profiles during our measurements.
In preliminary experiments, an additional location (France) was also evaluated,
but no additional differences were observed.
Finally, note that, in this paper, we only considered websites provided by
each airline company, rather than travel aggregators and meta search engines.
As such, our results should not be generalized to characterize the latter.
4 Results
Most of conducted the search queries returned multiple flight options, differing in
terms of flight routes and departure time. Therefore, after extracting the prices
from all search results, the minimum, maximum and average price per query
were calculated. Next, this data was plotted as a time-series for each profile.
Contrary to our expectations, we were not able to find any clear evidence of price
discrimination: the majority of the plots reveal no consistent price difference
between the user profiles.
For example, Fig. 1 shows the fluctuations of Ryanair’s minimum prices
recorded by the scraper located in the United States. We grouped together all
profiles that had the same price evolution throughout the entire experiment,
resulting in two distinct subsets. Of the 42 measurements, there is only one in-
stance (#33) where a different price is given to a subset of the profiles. When
examining the exact timestamp of each profile’s measurement, we find that all
profiles with a higher price at #33 were recorded consecutively and prior to all
measurements with a lower price. This reveals that, most likely, the observed
price difference is due to the price actively dropping while conducting the mea-
surements for #33, rather than due to price discrimination.
Fig. 1. Minimum price offered by Ryanair for all user profiles (US) over 21 days, for
the CRL - LPA route. A small amount of vertical jitter was applied to the data points,
in order to prevent the plotted lines from overlapping.
Fig. 2. Mean prices offered by KLM for all user profiles (BE) over 21 days, for the JFK
- AMS route. Note, that there are no measurements between #16-19, due to a network
problem. The thick black line represents the trend of all other profiles.
Some airlines showed rapid variations in the availability of tickets. In Fig. 2,
the mean price of a KLM route is plotted for each profile. For every measure-
ment, the vast majority of profiles has the same mean price, which results in a
clear and steady trend over time. However, numerous steep peaks and valleys
occur, affecting different profiles every time. When looking into these outliers, it
appears that they are caused by a constantly changing availability of flights. The
fluctuations are so dense that no two profiles shared the same price evolution
throughout the experiment.
Fig. 3. Minimum price offered by United Airlines in Belgium and the United States
over 21 days, for the SFO - BRU route. For a meaningful comparison, the listed Belgian
prices (in EUR) were converted to USD using the applicable exchange rate for that
time.
To evaluate price discrimination based on location, we examined the calcu-
lated statistics of the geographical profiles, e.g., we compared the absolute min-
ima of all American profiles to the absolute minima of Belgian profiles. Again, no
clear evidence of price discrimination was found: Nearly all airlines show similar
prices for both locations. However, as seen in Fig. 3, there was one exception
with United Airlines: for the first 15 days, the Belgian price was consistently
higher than the American price. At times, the Belgian price was listed 67.92
USD above the American. Remarkably, though, near the end of the experiment,
the Belgian minimum price dropped below the American price several times.
In a preliminary experiment, we looked into price discrimination in multi-
regional and multilingual websites. We compared the native region or language
(with respect to the airline company’s origin) with a non-native alternative. A
particularly interesting find was the Argentinian website of American Airlines.
As shown in Fig. 4, the price was consistently about 19% higher than the price
from the American website. After looking into this phenomenon, we discovered
that, as of March 18, 2013, the Argentinian government has imposed a tax of
Fig. 4. Price for a particular SFO - BRU flight offered by American Airlines for the
non-native (Argentina, in red) and native (US, in blue) profile over 21 days.
20% on credit card and holiday package purchases [21]. These taxes are counter-
measures for Argentina’s high inflation rate and perfectly explain the systematic
price difference.
5 Alternative explanations for the anecdotal evidence
In this section we discuss several possible phenomena that may appear to a
user as evidence of price discrimination, but actually have other causes. These
alternative explanations are based on the results of our analysis and additional
information concerning regulations and business specifics.
As shown earlier in Fig. 2, flight routes and their prices can be extremely
volatile. When we look at consecutive measurements for KLM, it is not uncom-
mon for a flight to suddenly become unavailable, only to reappear in the next
measurement. Taking into account that our measurements are roughly 1 minute
apart, it is likely that users will encounter different prices when performing two
consecutive searches.
When performing a search from several geographical locations, a user may
encounter different prices due to regulations and agreements specific to that re-
gion. For example, differences may occur simply due to currency conversions [13].
Also, a country may impose additional taxes, e.g., as seen with Argentina. In con-
trast, in Peru, some airlines have cheaper fares solely for Peruvian residents [11].
Specific agreements and partnerships may differ between regions as well, e.g.,
Southwest Airlines prohibit third-parties to use their price information. This
has, in the past, lead to an injunction against Orbitz [8] and withdrawal of
its flight data from the Airline Tariff Publishing Co. (ATPCO). This is a pos-
sible explanation for the less expensive flights on Kayak while searching from
Canada [6], mentioned in Section 2.2. As it turns out, the Canadian results con-
tained the lower priced Southwest Airlines flights, while the American results
did not.
Another phenomenon that can be perceived as price discrimination, is the
caching of prices: as explained in [10], travel companies do not display real time
price information. Instead, for the sake of cost and time efficiency, prices are
cached. This can possibly result in discrepancies between prices that were ini-
tially displayed and the price at the final step of the booking process. Further-
more, subsequent search queries may display the updated price which can be
higher or lower than the previously reported price.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, motivated by several anecdotal reports, we investigated the pres-
ence of price discrimination in airline ticket prices. Contrary to our expectations,
our three-week long experiment, spanning 25 different airlines, tens of user pro-
files, and two geographical locations, did not reveal the use of any systematic
price discrimination. Based on our findings, we argue that at least some of the
anecdotally reported price differences can be explained through alternate means,
such as government policies and variable taxation. We hope that our study can
serve as a reference for the current state of practice, and inspire longitudinal
studies that may uncover the future adoption of price discrimination by airline
companies. We make the data from our research publicly available so that it can
be used in future research [24].
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A Airlines
The list of airlines included in our analysis is as follows:
– American Airlines (aa.com)
– Aegean Airlines (aegeanair.com)
– Alaska Airlines (alaskaair.com)
– Alitalia (alitalia.com)
– British Airways (britishairways.com)
– Brussels Airlines (brusselsairlines.com)
– Cathay Pacific (cathaypacific.com)
– Delta (delta.com)
– EasyJet (easyjet.com)
– Emirates (emirates.com)
– HOP! (hop.fr)
– KLM (klm.com)
– LAN (lan.com)
– Lufthansa (lufthansa.com)
– Qantas (qantas.com.au)
– Qatar Airways (qatarairways.com)
– Ryanair (ryanair.com)
– Saudi Airlines (saudiairlines.com)
– Southwest Airlines (southwest.com)
– Turkish Airlines (turkishairlines.com)
– United Airlines (united.com)
– US Airways (usairways.com)
– Virgin Atlantic (virgin-atlantic.com)
– Widerøe (wideroe.no)
– Wizz Air (wizzair.com)
